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In 1985, the Secretary of Defense directed the services to adopt a weapons
management inventory concept that allows readiness and cost to be incorporated
into setting inventory levels. The plan is laid out in the Department of Defense's
Secondary Item weapon Systems Management Concept. The key to the concept is
increasing weapon system readiness at lower costs. Today, this weapons system
management concept is known as Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) and has been
implemented in all of the services with the exception of the Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps has started to progress toward RBS by chartering studies
by the Center for Naval Analysis including a review of RBS requirements and the
situation of the present state of logistics systems and data collection. CNA's
conclusions suggest a difficult road in implementing RBS due to inaccurate data
collection. It is recommended that the Marine Corps examine the Army's
implementation process due to weapon system commonality and problems
encountered in implementing RBS and develop their own implementation plan
spearhead by Precision Logistics. Once RBS is established as the inventory
management model, the Marine Corps will realize sufficient cost savings and an
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In 1982, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Juliano published a
memorandum stating:
The traditional approaches to determining inventory levels and
measuring supply performance have been related to the satisfaction
of demands for items of supply. Such approaches do not normally
identify the degree to which various secondary items contribute to
the operational availability of weapon systems. We are now
attempting to relate stockage decisions to the effect they have on
weapon system readiness. This concept represents a significant
departure from traditional supply management in that it shifts the
materiel manager's concern from item-oriented inventory
performance to a weapon system performance.... I cannot over-
emphasize the significance of this effort or the magnitude of changes
to our materiel management policies and processes that it offers
[Ref. 1].
This memorandum led to the 1985 publication of the Secretary of
Defense's directive which directed the services to adapt a weapons system
inventory management concept that would tie together end items, readiness and
cost:
Improving the material readiness and sustainability of our combat
forces is a top priority of the Department. In order to accomplish
this, we must develop and implement innovative approaches to
inventory management that enables us to focus our attention and
resources on the ideas that enhance end item readiness. Weapon
systems management is an approach that provides greatly improved
material management capabilities. Implementation to this approach
will be a long range, incremental effort and will require changes in
the area of supply, procurement maintenance, transportation, and
financial management. However, implementation of weapon system
management will improve material readiness significantly and will
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provide the capability to utilize defense resources more effectively.
[Ref. 2]
This directive was issued at the same time the General Accounting Office
(GAO) was conducting numerous audits on the large size and management of the
Department of Defense's inventories.
Since 1985, the Army, Navy and the Air Force have developed inventory
models that have incorporated the weapon system management concept. From
these models, the concept called Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) came to fruition.
RBS models use algorithms that provide recommended inventory levels through
the use of the marginal analysis technique, better known as the "best bang for the
buck".
The Air Force was the first to develop the new methodology. Tests showed
a decrease in backorders of 44% with 46% less investment than inventory models
that were previously used [Ref. 3]. The Navy was quick to follow the Air Force's
lead and incorporated RBS into their logistics support processes. Presently, the
Navy uses RBS methodology on the Arleigh Burke guided missile class of ships
and is making progress to incorporate other classes of ships within the next year.
The Army's implementation of RBS methodology was demonstrated at various
locations within the Nation Guard and the National Training Center at Fort Polk,
Louisiana [Ref. 3].
The Marine Corps has been slow in implementing RBS and has not yet
been put under GAO's microscope due to the Marine Corps small size of
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inventory. In 1990, Marine Corps Order (MCO) 4 105. IB was published
identifying the need for progression to a weapon system management structure.
The management structure would incorporate the 1 3 capabilities that were outlined
in the 1985 Secretary of Defense's directive on weapon systems management.
The 13 capabilities include:
(1) Application files
(2) Stock levels for weapon system using a availability based sparing
inventory model








(11) Development of planning
(12) Programming and budgeting system
(13) Budget execution and balancing resources
MCO 41 05. IB goes even as far as to delegate responsibilities for the weapons
system management concept to various commands throughout the Marine Corps
[Ref.4].
Little progress has been made in developing an implementation plan for
RBS, and weapon systems management is still idle. In the last two years, the
Marine Corps has showed a renewed interest in migrating to RBS and has
chartered the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) to perform multiple studies. The
studies investigate the requirements that are needed to migrate to a weapon system
inventory management concept through the use of RBS and the state of data
collection at the present time. Throughout the chartered studies and interviews
made by the author, CNA has continually suggested to analyze the Army's
implementation of RBS due to the commonality of weapon systems and sources of
supply support in order to develop an RBS implementation plan for the Marine
Corps.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research will address and answer the following questions:
1. Primary Research Question
How can RBS be successfully implemented into the Marine Corps?
2. Secondary Research Questions
• What is RBS and how does it differ from the present system?
• How has the Army implemented RBS? What were their past and
present problems?
• What are the anticipated problems for implementing RBS in the
Marine Corps? Are there common themes with the Army?
• What types of barriers will the Marine Corps likely encounter in
implementing RBS? How can they be overcome?
C. PURPOSE AND METHODOLGY
Progress to incorporate an RBS methodology has been slow. In order to
get the Marine Corps in compliance with the 1985 Department of Defense
directive, it is important to investigate the Army's implementation of RBS and
analyze their progress and shortcomings. Along with analyzing the Army's
implementation of RBS, it is also necessary to review the findings of CNA as
regards the present state of Marine Corps data collection and to determine if
common problems exist between the Army and the Marine Corps. Finally, an
implementation plan for implementing RBS within the Marine Corps needs to be
developed to provide a path for the migration to RBS.
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This study is limited to analyzing the studies and interviews by the United
States Army's Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) and the CNA
and their application to Marine Corps weapon systems.
E. STRUCTURE OF THESIS
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I presented the problem,
stated the purpose, and described the scope of the research effort and associated
research questions. Chapter II describes the item and system approaches and the
methodology of RBS. Chapter III analyzes the Army's problems in implementing
RBS and the various workarounds that they have developed. Chapter IV analyzes
the Marine Corps problems CNA has identified in implementing RBS. Chapter V
develops a plan for the Marine Corps to implement RBS.
II. INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
This chapter compares and contrasts demand based sparing (DBS) and
readiness based sparing (RBS) methodologies. It is important to understand the
limitations of the present demand based sparing compared to the ability of
readiness based sparing to provide inventory in support of readiness goals.
A. DEMAND BASED SPARING (DBS)
Demand based sparing methodology has played a major role in the
Department of Defense's inventory management for decades. It has been
characterized as a days of supply (DOS) and an item approach to inventory
management. In the item approach, stockage level decisions or, as referred to
throughout this thesis, a requirements determination to stock a given spare is made
independently of decisions made to stock other spares. Spares, as defined
throughout the thesis, are held replacements for like components on a weapon
system that can be repaired or disposed of when they fail.
The requirements determination uses the following criteria: safety levels
(SL), order and ship time (OST), and repair cycle times (RCT) of reparables.
Safety Levels (SL) are additional spares held on hand to support
contingencies and fluctuations in demand. Most of the time the same protection
level will be applied across all items. A protection level is a designated
percentage of spares that are on hand.
Order and ship time (OST) is the time it takes between requisitioning of
the spare and the time the requisitioning unit receives the spare.
Repair cycle time (RCT) is the time required to repair the inoperable item
to an operational status.
In the Marine Corps, historical demand is captured and translated into
demand per day. MCO 4400.151 establishes the DOS methodolgy to include a
60-day operating level, 30-day safety stock, an actual order OST level, and RCT
for repairables.
Once an item has been selected for stock, its depth must be determined.
One of the principal tools for managing the depth of stock is the requisitioning
objective/reorder point (RO/ROP). RO/ROP is principally derived from operating
level (OL), SL, and OST authorizations. Specifically, RO is the sum of the OL,
SL, and OST level. The ROP is the sum of the SL and OST level. The RO and
ROP serve to systematically advise the inventory manager when to purchase stock
and how much to purchase. Stock is ordered when the ROP is reached, and is
ordered up to the level of RO [Ref. 4].
One appropriate use of demand based sparing methodology is for non-
critical consumable spares. An example of a non-critical spare would be a
indicator bulb. The non-availability of this item would not render a weapon
system inoperable. As will be shown throughout this thesis, demand based sparing
algorithms would still be required even when RBS is used.
There are many disadvantages to DBS, which is currently employed in the
military and the Defense logistics Agency (DLA). First, DBS is considered to be
an item approach to inventory because it treats all items equally. A consumable
item that would not render a vehicle inoperable, a headlight for example, is treated
equally as an item that would render the vehicle inoperable. The headlight would
be considered a safety issue; this would not deter the vehicle from being driven in
a combat situation. An alternator would be an example of an item that would
render a vehicle completely inoperable.
Second, these items are not associated wun a particular weapon system
like a five-ton truck. Today, in an environment of dwindling budgets and military
readiness on top of every congressman's agenda, making sure that highly visible
weapon systems, such as the MlAl tank, maintain a high degree of readiness is a
must. The failure of not associating prospective spares with systems not only
degrades the operational availability of the system, but decreases readiness. Most
general officers would much rather accept a High Mobility Multi-Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) inoperable compared to a weapon system, such as a tank.
By using the item approach, inventory managers do not have the benefit of
decision support tools to make analytical, cost-readiness tradeoffs. For example,
let's assume the total number of spares required that are generated by the demand-
based sparing model dictates a stockage of $300,000 in parts. However, the budget
provides for only $100,000 for spares, and the inventory manager has no analytical
method for prioritizing the available investment; therefore, he/she is left to
determine adjustments based solely on experience and subjective decision making
techniques. Additionally, even if the inventory manager had the $300,000 to
invest, the demand-based sparing model does not relate inventory investment to
the readiness of the equipment being supported. Consequently, the inventory
manager could purchase all the parts recommended by the demand-based sparing
model only to discover that critical weapons systems still did not meet their
readiness objectives [Ref. 4].
Inventory mangers do use a form of the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ)
model for requirement's determination, a model that minimizes inventory ordering
and carrying costs. However, there are many drawbacks to the use of this model
in the military. First, demand is constant and known in this model. In the military
demand is fuzzy, meaning that it is unpredictable rather than constant. Secondly,
the model assumes that receipt of inventory is instantaneous. In this context,
instantaneous means that once an order is placed for a spare, the order arrives the
same day. This assumption is inaccurate due to the tremendous number of
backorders, which affect weapon system availability.
B. READINESS BASED SPARING (RBS)
Readiness based sparing is a system approach whose goal is to maximize
the operational availability of a weapon system within management imposed
budgetary constraints. Operational availability (A ) is the percentage of time that
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a system is capable of performing its intended function. The focus is on the entire
weapon system, and questions such as how much will it cost to obtain a spares in
order to attain availability of 90% for a particular weapon system and how much
would it cost to achieve a 95% spare availability are asked.
There are complexities related to each weapon system. Compare two spares
that can deadline the same weapon system. One spare may cost $100.00 while the
other costs $1,000.00. Since both spares can independently deadline the weapon
system, it is reasonable to assume that they both have identical impacts on
operational availability. However, since the spares have different impacts on the
budget, it is not reasonable to assume that it is optimal to stock the same amount
of each of these parts. Analyzing the costs of both spares and the similar impacts
on operational availability, more "bang for the buck" is received in stocking an
abundance of the least expensive part. It is also important to keep in mind that
spares that have twice the demand rate will have greater impact on operational
performance regardless of cost. Readiness based sparing determines the marginal
increase in operational performance per increase in unit spares cost. In this
manner, the most cost-effective spares can be added until the operational
performance requirement is adequately supported.
For RES, comparisons are made between spares in the categories of
demand, price, OST, RCT and criticality. Spares are selected to meet the
availability goal for the system. Therefore, there is no set demand threshold that a
repair part must meet to be eligible for stocking. The combination of demand and
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price can be used to determine the order in which spares are selected, and the
availability goal determines the total number of spares selected.
A weapon system availability-cost curve as shown in Figure 1 is helpful in
answering the questions of how much would it cost to attain a specific availability
or a higher one. The curve represents the dollar cost given incremental changes in
spares availability. Points that are located above and below the curve represent
inefficiencies. The law of diminishing returns is reflective in the curve also. At
successive levels of readiness with the increase in spares availability, the cost of
the additional availability also increases. This curve gives the inventory manager
the ability to see the difference in costs in relation to each level of spares
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The Marine Corps' maintenance strategy, like the Army's, distinguishes
between two different types of spares: Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) and a
consumable LRU. An LRU is a mission essential reparable such an alternator or a
circuit card. When an LRU is removed due to inoperability, it creates a "hole" in
the weapon system [Ref. 5]. The inoperable LRU is then turned into an immediate
maintenance activity (IMA) for repair. In exchange for the inoperable LRU, an
operable LRU is provided to fill the "hole" which was created by the removal of
the inoperable LRU. Once the replacement is complete, the weapon system is
restored to its original operating condition. If the LRU is not in stock, which often
occurs in the military, it will be placed on backorder only if funding is available.
The weapon system would then be on a non-availability status. If funding is not
available, the required LRU(s) are placed on a short funds priority list. Once
money is available, the LRU(s) would be placed on a backorder status. A
consumable LRU, such as a diode, is a mission essential repair part that is
removed from either a failed LRU or another failed consumable LRU [Ref. 6].
An important characteristic of an LRU is that it is memoryless. It is
classified as such because the time to the next failure is not dependent on the time
of the previous failure. Since the LRU is independent and random from the last
failure, it follows an exponential distribution, also known as a Poisson process.
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The Poisson process is also used for low demanded items because the mean time
between failures (MTBF) is unpredictable. When using the exponential
distribution, the number of demands or failures over any fixed time period is given
by the Poisson Distribution.
2. Indentured Structure
For a want ofa nail, a shoe was lost.
For want of a shoe, a horse was lost.
For want ofa horse, a rider was lost.
For want of a rider, the battle was lost
RBS accounts for the relationship between LRU(s) and consumable LRU(s)
when making stocking decisions using an indenture structure. An indenture
structure provides a hierarchy of parts in a manner similar to the way a typical
organization chart depicts a hierarchy of departments and units in an organization.
Lower indenture spares, such as gaskets and spark plugs, are common items that
can be used in several different assemblies and on items higher up the indenture
hierarchy. Clearly, a lower indenture part costs less than its parent. Due to its low
cost, there are incentives to stock lower indenture parts rather than their higher-
indenture parents. Conversely, when an item fails, it takes more time and
expertise to diagnose and replace the lower indenture items responsible for the
failure than whole assemblies or parent items. This extra time translates into
longer system downtime. This longer downtime establishes a compelling
incentive for the inventory manager to stock higher-indenture and high cost spares.
RBS balances these competing objectives and assists the inventory manager in
14
making stocking decisions [Ref. 4]. Figure 2 illustrates a breakdown/indentured





Figure 2. Breakdown of weapon system into LRU and
consumable LRU
3. The Single Site Model
The single site model is fundamental to the analysis of the RBS
methodology because it models the distribution of failures with the Poisson
Process. Even though this model is not realistic for military purposes, it is
important in describing the basic methodology of RBS.
The single site model looks at the spares selection only at a single base and
disregards spares determinations made at other bases and depots. The base is
regarded as the retail IMA level of the supply/maintenance structure, and the
depots are regarded as the wholesale supply/depot maintenance.
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This model maximizes weapon system availability by minimizing the
expected backorders (EBO) which increase the fill rate at a specific base. The
EBOs are the expected number of unfilled demands that exist at a point in time.
The fill rate is the percentage of demands that can be met at the time they are
placed. To minimize the EBO, the model uses a technique called marginal
analysis, also known as the "best bang for the buck" algorithm to achieve its goals
by efficiently optimizing the budget and/or by attaining an expected fill rate
[Ref. 5]. Each step of the marginal analysis algorithm, takes a heuristic approach
and identifies the delta (A) for each item to determine the next item to buy from a
list of spares candidates. This process is continued until the optimization goal is
realized. Below is the marginal analysis algorithm:
Stock level (s) is defined as
s= OH +DI - BO
where OH is the on hand inventory, DI is the quantity due in, and BO is the
number of backorders. Then the expected fill rate (EFR) is
EFR(s)=Pr{DI<_s-l}
For expected backorders compute the probability that the number of items
due in exceeds the stock level s, or
oo
EBO= ^(x-s)?r{DI = x)
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For each item (at stock level s=0) with the cost (c), compute the quantity
(marginal analysis technique) [Ref. 7]
EBO(s)-EBO(s + l)
C
This formula shows the marginal decrease in expected backorders per unit
cost obtained by adding one unit of a particular item. An example of the use of the
marginal analysis technique is shown below.
In Table 2.1, the two items are shown with mean or average annual
demand, the average repair time (days), the average pipeline (the number of units
of the item in repair), and the item cost [Ref. 5]. In Table 2.2, the A is the marginal
decrease in the EBO (marginal increase in operational availability) per unit cost by
adding one additional unit of stock. The Poisson distribution calculates the EBO
values [Ref. 5].
Table 2.1. Two Items Compared
ITEMS
1 2
Mean annual demand 10 50
Average repair time 0.1 0.8
Average pipeline 1 4
Item cost($000) 5 1
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Table 2.2. Marginal Analysis Technique
ITEM 1 ITEM 2
s EBO(s) A EBO(s) A
1.000 4.000
1 0.368 .126 3.018 0.982
2 0.104 .053 2.110 0.908
3 0.023 .016 1.348 0.762
4 0.004 .004 0.782 0.567
5 0.001 0.410 0.371
6 0.000 0.195 0.215
7 0.000 0.085 0.111
8 0.000 0.034 0.051
9 0.000 0.012 0.021
Notice that before stocking any items, the expected backorders are 1.000
and 4.000 and that the total 5.000 is equal to the total amount in the pipeline and is
the expected demand. The first A's for the two items are 0.126 [(1.00 - .368)/5]
and 0.982 [(4.00 — 3.018)/!]. In comparison we would get more "bang for the
buck" if we add another item 2. Next compare 0.126 and 0.908, and add another
unit to item 2, and so on until the comparison is between 0.126 and 0.1 1 1. At this
time the first unit of item 1 is added. This process is continued until the
optimization goal is achieved [Ref. 7].
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4. Multi-Echelon Problem
The single site model explains the very basic concepts of the readiness
based sparing model. However, there are several reasons why a multi-echelon
model is needed. First, a multi-echelon model depicts how the military actually
operates in its complex supply/maintenance environment. Secondly, decisions
must be made throughout the entire supply system on the optimal spares to have
on hand to satisfy EBOs that are generated by demand. Using the single site model
for all bases would sub-optimize the total system because it would be ignoring like
decisions at other bases. A decision to carry a specific spare at the base should
depend upon what is carried at the depot. If the item were carried at the depot, the
bases would be disinclined to stock it. If the spare were not carried at the depot,
there would be an incentive to carry the spare at the base level. Thus, interactions
between bases and depots need to be taken into account [Ref. 7].
There are many factors that contribute to the time required to re-supply a
LRU to a base: demand rate, the maintenance concept that consists of the levels of
repair, RCT, SL, OST, and the pipeline. Repair times and quantities on hand and
in repair vary from depot to depot.
The time required resupplying a consumable LRU to a base is under the
same constraints as the LRU with the exception of repair cycle times. Putting a
spare at the depot will affect the resupply times ranging from days to weeks at a
base. Furthermore, base spares' levels and resupply times impact the time a
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weapon system will be inoperable due to delays in filling a non-mission capable
supply (NMCS) requisition at the base level.
The multi-echelon RBS model makes decisions on where and how much to
stock LRUs and consumable, and it optimizes the total system by accounting for
the attributes at each activity at each echelon [Ref. 7]. To find cost effective
stockage decisions, it is necessary to not only distribute a fixed number of spares
throughout the entire system but also to know the optimal number of spares to
distribute and the logistics delay time for each type of spare.
D. DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR DBS AND RBS
In Table 2.3, a side by side comparison of DBS and RBS data requirements
is provided. The data required for the RBS model versus the DBS model provides
the impetus for the required weapon systems inventory management as mandated
by the Department of Defense.
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The readiness based sparing inventory model, unlike demand based
sparing, is a concept for requirement's determination that associates spares to
individual weapon systems in order to sustain a specified operational availability.
RBS responds to the changing needs, priorities, and management-imposed
constraints of a weapon system in the most cost-effective manner to ensure the
readiness of the system is not degraded. As mentioned in Chapter I, the
Department of Defense has mandated the progression to readiness based sparing
methodology to sustain a high readiness posture.
Progressing to RBS is a complete paradigm shift from the DBS inventory
model. This chapter provided a foundation that will be needed in understanding
the problems that the Army is having and the future problems Marine Corps will
have in transitioning to RBS and developing an implementation plan.
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III. UNITED STATES ARMY'S RBS MODEL AND ISSUES
Moving from the item approach to the systems approach in inventory
management has been a complete paradigm shift for the Army. In this Chapter,
the discussion will explore the variety of "workarounds" the Army has
incorporated to bypass past and present inaccurate data collection, the field
demonstrations conducted to support RBS, and the cultural problems that
presently exist in accepting RBS.
A. SYSTEMS APPROACH
As identified in Chapter II, when using an RBS model, there is a necessity
in the systems approach to identify all parts that are associated with weapon
systems. These associations create an indentured structure of the weapon system.
The indentured structure establishes a tree-like breakdown, which classifies how
all the parts are interrelated within the weapon system. Developing the parts
association has become a cumbersome task for the Army. One way that the Army
has tried to tackle this task is by the use of end item codes and materiel category
codes.
1. End Item Codes (EIC)
To run any RBS model effectively, as compared to the present Army and
Marine Corps DBS stockage computations, parts must be associated with end
items. It is conceivable that failed LRUs can belong to different end items.
Unless time is taken to identify the parts' end item association, demand data for
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the weapon system will be inaccurate. If parts are not identified accurately, Army
personnel at the retail level would have to decide which vehicle the part belonged
to. This decision would affect the RBS model during the requirements
determination for the authorized stock list (ASL). An ASL is allowance of stocks
that are authorized to be on hand.
End item codes (EIC) are three digit codes that identify a specific weapon
system. The first position of the EIC depicts a broad category of items and the
item manager that is responsible for that category for example, the U.S Army
Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM). The second position further identifies
the items in relation to a broad generic group of end items such as the Ml Main
battle tank. The third position identifies the specific tank, M1A1 [Ref. 8]. The use
of EICs attempts to solve the problem of associating parts with end items and to
develop a single level of indentured structure.
Presently, the problem is that EICs are not available for most of the national
stock numbers (NSN) demanded. The Army is slowly providing EICs for all
NSN. It is estimated that this process will take several more years.
2. Materiel Category Codes (MATCAT)
To overcome the lack of end item codes, the Army transitioned to the use
of materiel category codes, which are present for each NSN in the Army Master
Data File (AMDF). The AMDF consists of the national stock number listed in the
demand file, preferred national stock number, nomenclature, materiel code,
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essentiality code, supply material category code, unit price, maintenance repair
code, weight, and cube [Ref. 9].
The MATCAT is a five position alphanumeric code that identifies the
material category structure. For the purpose of RBS, only the last two positions
are used [Ref. 10]. The MATCAT identifies the end item but lacks the specificity
of the EIC. The specificity is not required because all weapon systems are broken
down into twelve weapon system groups. The weapon system groups consists of
aircraft, combat, communications, DLA, electronics, generators, weapons, Ml,
Ml 13, missile, tactical and high demands [Ref. 9]. When the Army runs the RBS
model, if any of the weapon system groups contain less than 100 NSNs, that
weapon system group is combined with another group. This is to ensure that one
or two national stock numbers do not dominate the authorized stock list (ASL). A
RBS system can run all the groups at one time, but due to processing time, which
can take a couple of minutes to a couple of hours depending on the number of
NSNs, the Army limits the RBS model to one group at a time.
B. INFORMATION COLLECTION
1. Demand
A major problem with demand is variability. It is difficult to estimate on a
daily basis that there will be, for example, ten demands for a specific spare in a
given year. An estimation of an average demand is possible, but this average must
also include a forecasting error. If the division typically has 300 tanks and each
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tank is rendered inoperable every 15 days, and there are 2,000 parts on the tank,
not every part fails annually. This leads to the difficulty in forecasting specific
spare demand when no data exists for specific parts over a period of time. For
example, a certain NSN may not fail for a couple of years, thus demand would not
be present.
The Army bases its peacetime retail stocks of spares on rules that are
established by Army Regulation (AR) 710-2, "Inventory Management Policy
Below the Wholesale Level" [Ref. 11]. This regulation provides policy and
implementation guidance for stockage determination and the replenishment
processes in retail inventory management. For stocks to be qualified candidates to
be incorporated in the ASL, they must qualify by add/retain criteria. Add/retain
criteria establish that parts must have 9 demands within 360 days to be viable
candidates for listing on a unit's ASL.
The add/retain criteria may seem like an efficient way to manage
inventories, but it has some significant drawbacks. For example, an army division
ASL may have approximately 12,000 items stocked. When the ASL is yearly
updated approximately 2,000 to 3,000 line items drop off due to not qualifying
within the criteria to be stocked at the division ASL. When the Army attempted to
update the ASL on a five-year basis, again there was a significant number of items
that dropped off due to lack of sufficient demand history.
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A 1996 study by the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA)
attempted to show the shortfalls of the add/retain criteria at the 3rd Infantry
Division. AMSSA identified that 79 percent of the mission essential stocks that
were demanded had fewer than the nine required demands and thus would not
have qualified to be on the ASL in accordance with AR710-2. Specifically, 51
percent of the stocks demanded had fewer than three demands (Ref. 12).
There are two striking shortcomings resulting from using the add/retain
criteria. First, readiness is reduced. As shown in the 3rd Infantry Division study,
79 percent of the customer's demands were not filled due to the stocking criteria.
This translates to a decrease in weapon systems readiness. Concurrently, the
weapon systems readiness will remain low until the spare is received from the next
source of supply. This time frame can range from three days to more than 30
days.
Secondly, incentives for "gaming" are created by individual unit
commanders so that mission essential parts qualify as candidates for the ASL.
Units begin to artificially reduce the quantity demanded on one requisition to
submit multiple requisitions. Another alternative is to submit requisitions for
stocks that the unit does not require at the time but does so to artificially increase
the number of demands.
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2. Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
The incentives to manipulate demand contribute, to a large extent, to the
inaccurate demand data that the Army now has to contend with. One way to
combat this problem is to find the MTBF for mission essential parts.
MTBF measures how often the weapon system is inoperable due to a
specific corrective action. Presently, the Army RBS model does not include
MTBF. This lack of MTBF data within the model impedes the Army in
calculating systems failures [Ref. 13]. There is a move by AMSAA to gather
MTBF data for LRUs. This is a time demanding process, but when the MTBF for
first line indentured LRUs are identified then AMSAA will be able to provide
more concise spares calculations.
AMSAA' s first major step in calculating MTBFs for the entire weapon
system was to gather all functional and technical experts throughout the Army
from all the major weapon systems programs to provide fleet wide averages for
weapon systems. Due to the inaccurate demand data, these averages were based
on the incidence of any type of failure for the entire weapon system.
The Army established the following MTBF averages for the indicated
weapon systems. Days refer to incidence of any type of failure: track vehicle's
MTBF is fifteen days, wheeled vehicles are thirty days, and electronic end items
sixty days [Ref. 13].
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3. NSN Changes
Another issue that the Army identified that can cause a problem to an RBS
model is changes in national stock numbers. When modifications are made to an
LRU, a change in the national stock number will reflect those modifications. The
problem is amplified when all the national stock numbers for the same LRU,
modified and non-modified, are resident in the retail and wholesale mainframes,
resulting in all national stock numbers becoming suitable replacements for the
same LRU. Since all the national stock numbers from the LRU are resident at
both levels, units will requisition the different national stock numbers. Thus, the
RBS models will recommend stocking the multiple national stock numbers of the
same LRU. To correct this problem, guidance must be provided at the item
manager level, identifying which LRU national stock number is the prime, and
thus not requisitioning the others. Correction of this problem is ongoing [Ref. 13].
To alleviate this problem, representatives from the Department of Defense and
outside agencies must be involved.
C. ARMY MODELS
AMSAA developed two RBS models for developing stockage
requirements: the Selective Essential Item Stockage for Availability Method
(SESAME) and the Optimal Stock Requirements Analysis Program (OSRAP).
SESAME is a four echelon, two level of indenture, inventory model. It
determines optimal stock lists in a multi-echelon system and evaluates alternative
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stock lists for the supply/maintenance system. This model has been used at the
wholesale level for the Army's initial spares budgeting and procurement for more
than a decade [Ref. 5].
After seeing favorable results in using SESAME, the Army Materiel
Command (AMC) directed the use of this model in all initial wholesale
provisioning decisions. In a directive dated 16 April 1990, General Tuttle, AMC,
stated RBS provided the Army with an opportunity to support readiness of weapon
systems at the least cost and that the benefits to be gained should not be delayed
[Ref. 3].
Unfortunately, this fanfare was short-lived. After the initial provisioning of
two years was completed, the retail level reverted the stockage requirements back
to the present AR710-2 computations. The only explanation for the reverting back
to the AR710-2 computation is retail level supply's reluctance in accepting RBS
methodology.
OSRAP is a coordinated multi-echelon model that determines optimal
levels and reorder points for class IX (repair parts). Its goal is to produce an
optimal cost solution while meeting desired performance goals. OSRAP had been
used in computing stockage requirements for operational contingencies in
Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti [Ref. 14]. A personal
computer-based version of OSRAP has been developed for material managers at
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all supply levels. However, it is a stand-alone system and is not embedded within
the retail supply system architecture [Ref. 3, 13, 14]. This lack of integration
is a factor why the Army has not adopted RBS.
D. RBS FIELD DEMONSTRATIONS
The objective of the RBS field demonstrations was to determine if this
methodology provided cost savings while maintaining readiness and improving
supply performance for field units compared to ASLs computed using AR710-2
stockage computations and management discretion. The first field demonstration
was located at the National Training Center (NTC) in 1992, followed by
quantitative studies located at the 3rd Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry
Division in 1996.
1. National Training Center (NTC)
This demonstration's objective was to identify cost savings while
maintaining the same level of readiness and to determine if there was an increase
in supply performance such as fill rates [Ref. 9].
a. Cost Savings
In the NTC demonstrations, net costs were significantly less than
ASL prior to the demonstration. The cost of the ASL was reduced from $126.7
million to $68.7 million. Net assets (on hand + due in - due out) were reduced by
$37 million [Ref. 9].
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b. Equipment Readiness
Equipment readiness indicators increased from 66 to 82 percent with
RBS [Ref. 9]. The readiness indicators consisted of Equipment Mission Capable
(EMC) and Non-Mission Capable Supply (NMCS).
c. Supply Performance
In all measures of supply performance, RBS outperformed ASL as
shown below in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. NTC Field Demonstration Supply Performance Results
[Ref. 9]
MEASURE ASL RBS ASL
Demand Accommodation 64 percent 81 percent
Demand Satisfaction 70 percent 88 percent
Fill Rate 45 percent 71 percent
High Priority Fill Rate 48 percent 72 percent
The most striking figure that is exhibited in this table is the 26% increase in
the fill rate in RBS over ASL. This shows that parts that are essential to readiness
were readily available to the unit. This translates to fewer demands being
forwarded to another level of supply support, the wholesale level, for parts that
were causing a weapon system to be inoperable.
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2. 3rd Infantry Division
This study used demand history from January to December 1996. The
study included a cost distribution of demand, and compared the supply
performance of RBS, actual ASL, and an ASL recommended by the Standard
Army Retail Supply System-Objective (SARSS-O). The SARSS-O is a retail
level supply system and uses AR710-2 computation in developing stockage
requirements.





Size 5,604 Lines 5,424 Lines 11,612 Lines
Value $28.6 Million $80.3 Million $34.3 Million
Demand Accommodation 79 percent 68 percent 86 percent
Demand Satisfaction 75 percent 80 percent 94 percent
Fill Rate 59 percent 54 percent 80 percent
Of the 38,364 NMCS demands, 71 percent of the requisitions were less
than $100.00 each [Ref. 9]. The RBS ASL was 22 percent more costly than the
SARSS-O, which can be attributed to the additional lines carried. However, in
supply performance, the RBS ASL outperformed both ASLs. In this case, similar
to the demonstration at NTC, requisitions were filled at the unit level vice being
passed on to the wholesale level. Again, this translates to an increase in readiness
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for weapon systems. The increase in the fill rate of 21-26% is a definitive reason
that shows the need for RBS.
3. 25th Infantry Division
In this study the demand history was accumulated from April 1996 to
September 1996, and RBS ASL was compared only to the actual ASL. As found
in the previous studies, the RBS ASL out-performed and was $ 2.7 million less
than the actual ASL.
Table 3.3. 25th Infantry Division Performance [Ref. 12]
MEASURE ACTUAL ASL RBS ASL
Size 3,019 Lines 5,165 Lines
Value $8.4 Million $5.7 Million
Demand Accommodation 64 percent 80 percent
Demand Satisfaction 72 percent 85 percent
Fill Rate 46 percent 68 percent
As depicted in Table 3.3, the RBS ASL had a greater number of lines, but
the total cost of the inventory was $ 2.7 million lower, demand accommodation
and satisfaction increased byl6% and 13%, and the fill rate increase by 14%. This
study provides another example of how the marginal analysis technique provides
the "best bang for the buck".
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E. ANALYSIS OF FIELD DEMONSTRATIONS
In reviewing the three studies, the RBS ASL consistently demonstrated that
this model outperforms the actual ASLs that follow the AR 710-2. On average,
RBS ASL outperformed actual ASL by 20 percent in demand accommodation, 21
percent in demand satisfaction and 17 percent in fill rate. These demonstrations
indicate that an ASL developed using the RBS methodology could reduce the
amount of investment required, and in some cases, improve the current level of
readiness and supply performance that is now being achieved using AR710-2 ASL
computations.
F. THE WAR RESERVE REQUIREMENT
1. Data Collection
In the wartime environment there are numerous challenges that affect all
aspects of military operations. The greatest challenge for the logistician is in
providing the required support to sustain a combat force. This support must be
present within the operations area or be available from the combat service support
area. An operational commander cannot have a major weapon system be
inoperable before a major engagement due to a spare not being available in a
spares block.
Field Exercise Data Collection (FEDC) is an effort established by AMSSA
to answer this challenge. FEDC is a data collection effort that collects part
replacement rates for combat required mission essential end items from wartime
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training exercises. The information collected through FEDC will be used for the
wartime reserve RBS calculations. In the past, the Army relied on peacetime
demand requirements to satisfy its wartime requirements. To satisfy the expected
increase in demand and develop stockage requirements during actual combat
operations, a multiplier is used to determine peacetime demand rates.
Another means of collecting data was performed on individual end items
during normal peacetime usage and field training exercises over a specified period
of time [Ref. 15]. The Army Materiel Command's major subordinate commands'
field training exercises consisted of two to three weeks of simulated combat. This
combat environment enabled AMSAA to collect parts replacement rates,
petroleum and lubricants data, and manpower requirements from battalion sized
units.
FEDC began in September 1982 with exercises conducted in Germany.
Since these initial exercises, it has expanded to NTC at Fort Irwin California,
Korea, Kuwait, and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk. Since its
inception in 1982, data from more than 200 mission essential end items that
participated in more than 500 exercises have been put into the FEDC database
[Ref. 15]. With the use of this database, AMSAA is now able to extract
information on LRU failure rates for calculating the MTBF rates.
Data collection during the FEDC is comprised of three phases. The first
phase consists of briefing the soldiers who are involved in the exercise. The brief
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explains the rationale for the data collection and how the data collection can
provide the necessary information to support combat forces. All mission essential
end items that are involved in the exercises are inventoried, the individual
maintenance records are reviewed, and a limited technical inspection of the end
items is completed. The limited technical inspection consists of operational and
safety inspections. The second data collection phase begins with the start of the
exercise and proceeds with collection of data from failed LRUs and consumable
LRUs. At this point, vehicles that are inoperable are documented with the repairs
required, mean time to repair figures, and manpower dedicated in the repair
process demands. The final phase involves a final technical inspection of the end
items and the repair and documentation of any failed LRU or consumable LRUs.
Annually, a summary of each of the sites is produced and distributed to all
major Army commands. The summary includes end item profiles, man-hour
requirements, parts usage profiles, and exercise parts usage planning factors for
each site [Ref. 15].
2. RBS Demonstrations
To promote the OSRAP RBS model for war reserve requirements, AMSSA
made a stockage determination comparison between OSRAP using RBS
methodology and the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) using the
AR710-2 days of supply computation. The objective was to identify which model
provided stockage requirements in relation to cost and readiness for the weapon
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systems. The demonstration showed that OSRAP provided a larger breadth of
spares, achieved the readiness goals, and also afforded a 20 percent reduction in
overall total cost.
In an interesting twist of fate, AMSAA discovered that the preliminary run
of OSRAP saved more money than was expected. After revalidating the dollar
value, there was uneasiness on AMSAA' s part to release the dollar figure. If
AMSAA provided the dollar value to the Army, the Army would not believe the
dollar value, causing the Army to doubt the credibility of the model.
The significant savings occur for the following reasons. The review of
RBS in Chapter II described how use of the marginal analysis technique provided
an ASL with the "best bang for the buck". Consequently, the model selected the
items that were low cost, high demand, and frequently backordered. The dollar
value dropped dramatically because the engines were dropped off the ASL.
Because the unit costs are very high and demand for an entire engine low, the ASL
recommended a small number to be on hand. Due to the low total cost, resulting
in the perception of model unreliability, AMSAA decided to add additional M1A1
engines back into the model, using the justification of stocking more engines at the
retail level. The dollar figure was provided that each engine cost approximately
$500,000 and the total dollar value of the engines was 25% of the wartime reserve
budget [Ref. 13].
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In analyzing the field demonstration, AMSSA deliberately decreased some
of the savings due to the uneasy feeling of saving the Army too much money and
stocking a small amount of engines. To support the end result, AMSSA gave the
war reserve officers the actual stockage lists, after adding the engines, for the lines
that they supported and the results of the RBS model to the Army. The Army
compared the data and realized that readiness did increase and the depth of the
high dollar items decreased. The data was acceptable to the Army.
G. ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS
The use of RBS methodology is not new. As discussed in Chapter I, the
Department of Defense and the Army have been developing models and the
methodology since the late 1980s. As already stated, field demonstrations at
various Army sites have proven that readiness based sparing is effective in retail
applications. Throughout the demonstrations, RBS has provided better outcomes
for supply performance parameters such as stockage levels, fill rate and zero
backorders. Universally, the RBS provides more stock for less cost and has a
higher fill rate percentage. Yet, to this day, AMSAA has not had the army
officially approve the standard use of RBS. RBS has been recognized in the
current update of the AR710-2 only as an optional method of stockage
determination.
Why has RBS not been accepted as the standard? This lack of acceptance
suggests that there is resistance to change.
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H. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
During an interview with AMSAA officials in Aberdeen, MD, the question
was asked why apprehension exists in the acceptance of RBS. AMSAA identified
two main reasons. The first is mistrust in the stockage selection. As the field
demonstrations have continuously shown, the breadth of inventory lines had
increased. This increase was balanced out with the decrease in high dollar, high
visibility items.
The active duty Army, even though it is going through a period of austere
budgets, continues to want to stock high cost items. For example, the Army still
desires to stock a large percent of M1A1 engines, with a unit cost of $500,000,
when the RBS model identified the need for carrying a smaller percent of engines.
This problem is explained by the cultural mentality that "more is better" which is
common to all services and is the chief barrier to RBS implementation. When the
"more is better" mentality is invoked, expensive items have higher visibility and
are thus more are purchased. Ironically, most weapon systems become inoperable
not due to repairs that require an engine replacement, but ones that require parts
costing less than $100.00. But there continues to be the mindset that the more
engines that are on hand, the better off the Army is.
A subset of this problem is the question of what to do with the present
inventory that the RBS model recommends not to stock. Many General
Accounting Office (GAO) studies have identified that all the services, including
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the Army, have spares on hand in excess of necessary operational requirements. If
the Army could return the spares to the suppliers for a credit, the Army may only
get pennies on the dollar for them [Ref. 12].
The Army must also be aware that large on-hand inventories have a
tendency to mask additional problems, such as unknown customer demands and
lack of inventory training. An analogy that can be used is a stream full of rocks.
The water in the stream represents inventory flow and the rocks represent potential
problems. The water in the stream hides the variability and problems. Because
the problems are hidden by the inventory, they are sometimes hard to find. By
reducing the inventory, management can expose the problems and chip away at
them until the stream is clear.
During a brief to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics), AMSAA provided a
chart that they believed was the most effective way to convince management to
use RBS in the active Army. AMSSA showed that the Army Material Command
(AMC) had about 600,000 NMCS records to restore an end item to operational
capability, of which 75 percent of the backordered requisitions were for parts
under $10.00 [Ref. 13]. There is a likelihood that the costs to manage each of
these small dollar requisitions are more than $10.00 because the requisitions were
sent to an outside source of supply rather than the Army retail supply level. With
the Army's present add/retain criteria, these low demanded parts would not be on
the ASL. The way this problem can be solved is take one of the $500,000 engines
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and buy 50,000 of these $10.00 NMCS requisitions and thus drive the back orders
to zero. AMSAA believes that if they can get people to understand the need to
move to RBS, the Army may be able to achieve 90 percent operational availability
for any end item.
The second reason for the Army's apprehension in accepting RBS is the
belief that the commanders are losing control in stocking decisions. In the Army,
individual units maintain inventories of various spares. The individual
commanders provide personal experience and make recommendations based on
their experience to manipulate the requisitioned objective.
The possibility also exists that apprehension in accepting RBS in the Army,
even though numerous fielded demonstrations were completed with positive
results, is caused by the lack awareness and understanding of what RBS is and
how it works. Army officers who have served in the Quartermaster Corps at best
only vaguely know of the RBS concepts. Misunderstanding of RBS can lead to
invalid assumptions and inappropriate conclusions concerning its implementation.
I. SUMMARY
For the past eight years, AMSAA has been trying to implement RBS as the
primary spares requirements model for the Army. Furthermore, AMSSA has on
numerous occasions briefed the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, explaining the
rationale for the move to RBS methodology. Field demonstrations were
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completed providing improved supply performance in the areas of fill rate and
demand accommodation.
The main reason for the Army's resistance to implementing RBS is the
lack of understanding and knowledge of the concepts and methodology of RBS.
Despite all the briefings and field demonstrations, communications throughout the
Army about RBS is lacking. As pointed out, many of the personnel who should be
involved in RBS are the ones resisting the move to this methodology because they
do not understand it and have not been trained about its concepts.
The lack of communication throughout the Army is partially due to the lack
of education between and within subordinate commands. With a paradigm shift in
inventory management of this magnitude, simple briefings will not bring an
absolute change in Army inventory thinking. Subordinate commanders must also
be briefed by AMSSA on RBS. Once an understanding at this level is established
and commanders are on board, then RBS may come to fruition. Acceptance of
RBS by commanders would lead to training programs on accurate data collection
and a concerted effort by the Army to satisfy the data requirements that are needed




IV. MARINE CORPS MOVE TO READINESS BASED SPARING
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak, set out the goals
for Precision Logistics in his White Letter No. 01-97. In a passage from the White
Letter:
Precision Logistics will be the vehicle by which we will sustain the
Marine Corps of the 21 st century. By adapting the best commercial
practices and leveraging proven technology advances, Precision
Logistics will provide responsive and reliable support to the Fleet
Marine Force (FMF) at home and across the full spectrum of
expeditionary operations. Precision Logistics provides the decisive
support our Marine Forces need by substituting process
improvements, asset visibility, and a customer-oriented distribution
system for the current costly, inflexible and cumbersome one. More
than a set of procedures, Precision Logistics will lead to a cultural
and paradigm change in the way we think and operate [Ref. 16].
To support these efforts and the premise of Precision Logistics, the Deputy
Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics (I&L) chartered various studies
performed by CNA in evaluating the present supply support systems and the ease
to switch over to an RBS methodology. The studies concluded that the Marine
Corps has a difficult road ahead. The most demanding challenges are Marine
Corps logistical information systems and the requirement for data. In this chapter,
discussion will encompass the problems with logistics information systems that
the Marine Corps presently utilize and data collection.
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A. LOGISTICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS
The data necessary to support RBS is derived from four sources: the Marine
Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS), the Supported Activity
Supply System (SASSY), the Applications File, and the Marine Corps Readiness
Evaluation System (MARES).
1. Marine Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS)
MIMMS records all organic and intermediate level maintenance actions
performed on end items. Maintenance personnel use the system to record all the
equipment repair orders (EROs) that were opened to bring the inoperable end item
back to operational status. EROs consist of the national stock number (NSN) unit
of issue, quantity, and document numbers of the repair parts that are required to
bring the end item back to its operational status. This system records the date the
requisition was submitted, any transactions against the requisitions such as status,
and the date when the supply section received the parts. Accuracy of this data is
very important to any form of sparing models.
Data from this source can derive usage rates, repair rates, item demands,
and repair times for reparable components for particular end items. The key
problems inherent with this data source, as described by Anne Hale, was that the
current usage rates were not tied to a specific end item and the usage rates were
based on peacetime data [Ref. 17]. Second, the repair rates do not extend to all
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levels of indenture for the end item, and it is difficult to determine if the
component was repaired or inducted into the next echelon of maintenance
[Ref. 18]. Third, RCT does not extend to all levels of indenture. To repair these
problems, indenture structure for all end items must be resident within the system.
This would then compensate for the lack of RCT and usage being tied to specific
end items.
2. Supported Activity Supply System (SASSY)
SASSY contains the inventory management and requirement determination
codes that are used for calculating requisitioning objectives for peacetime
reparable and consumable stocks [Ref. 18]. The main problems identified by
Anne Hale are that this data source is difficult to understand and use. Stock
quantities are listed under different headings and different places from where the
item is physically located. Also, the file does not contain a component list with a
corresponding inventory quantity [Ref. 17].
3. Applications File
The Applications File contains end item configurations data and indenture
relationships between the end item and its components. This file was identified as
inaccurate and does not contain the mission critical components essential to a
multi-indentured RBS inventory model. The alternative to this file is to comb
through the technical publications for each end item and piece together the mission
essential components.
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4. Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation System
(MARES)
MARES is the Marine Corps system that records the operational status of
selected end items as reported by the Marine Forces. MARES provides historical
measures for readiness which are measured by "R" and "S" ratings. "R" is a
measurement of how many particular end-items are operational and are available
at a specific location. "S" measures how many end items a specific location
possesses and compares the number of end items that location is authorized to
possess [Ref. 17].
B. MARINE CORPS DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR READINESS-
BASED SPARING MODELS
In all of the chartered Marine Corps studies completed by CNA, CNA has
concluded that the Marine Corps will have difficulties migrating to a RBS
methodology because data contained in its information systems are neither
accurate nor complete enough to support the more extensive RBS model data
requirements.
1. Weapon System Data
Weapon system information is not required for demand-based sparing, but
is necessary to support RBS models. Current Marine Corps logistical information
systems do not capture the detailed weapon system data elements necessary to take
full advantage of such models. The weapon system data elements that must be
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captured include indenture structure, end-item criticality, end-item density, and
end-item usage.
a) Building Detailed Indentured Structures
Indentured structures, as shown in Chapter II, are required inputs
that are important to RBS because they identify the components of end items in
terms of their contribution to a system's availability. The indentured structure of
an end item is generally obtained through the acquisition process as part of
provisioning data. Often this provisioning data is neither accurate nor updated on
any time interval.
The Marine Corps uses provisioning data from contractors in
building the Applications File, which is a database maintained at Marine Corps
Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany, Georgia. It contains end-item configuration data
and indentured relationships, but currently the Applications File only provides a
single level of indenture; that is, it only associates a repair part to its end-item, not
to the assemblies and subassemblies [Ref. 4]. Therefore, the indenture structure
for Marine Corps end items is both inaccurate and incomplete. John Ivancovich
and Brian Butters identified three data fields present within the Applications File,
such as item designator number (IDN), IDN "consists of, IDN "part of and
indentured code; however, these fields, presently, are inadequate to develop the
basic indentured structure to support RBS [Ref. 18]. These fields can support
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RBS, but they must be overhauled and the correct data for all end items must be
inducted.
Through numerous interviews with CNA personnel, it was
recommended that the Marine Corps take control of developing indentured
structure for all of its end items. This structure for all end items currently exists
within technical publications in the form of diagrams; this information needs to be
incorporated in building an indentured structure. To incorporate all end items with
the thousands of associated parts would be monumental task. CNA recommended
taking the Army approach of grouping or prioritizing end items as referred to in
Chapter III. Prioritizing end items can be accomplished by using current Marine
Corps classifications of end items as referred in Marine Corps Bulletin 3000.
There are estimated to be 1 ,000 end items within the Marine Corps inventory. Of
the 1,000 end items, 18% are deemed as mission essential. These end items
should serve as candidates for RBS [Ref. 4].
Captain Penrose also suggested that once the prioritization of end
items is completed, combat essentiality codes for the respective parts associated
with the prioritized end items need to be established. It is also known within the
Marine Corps that combat essentiality codes are lacking in correctness. A
thorough review of the parts should be conducted and parts with combat
essentiality codes of 5 and 6 should be spared from using RBS. Combat
essentiality codes 5 and 6 are repair parts whose failure in a combat essential end-
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item will render it inoperable or reduce its effectiveness below the minimum
acceptable level of efficiency. Combat essentiality codes will be discussed later in
this chapter.
The Army has already started to develop the indentured structure for
grouping of end items. Since there is an 85% commonality in end items between
the Army and the Marine Corps, coordination between the two services is
required. The AMSSA's OSRAP model is only a single indenture, but interviews
with AMSSA identified a need to have three levels of indenture. The Marine
Corps is in a good position to gather the indenture structures for common end
items already developed by the Army. Ultimately, the end item mangers for the
Marine Corps and the Army must coordinate their efforts for the common cause.
This creates a feedback mechanism to ensure the accuracy of information. To help
the Department of Defense extract end item data, future acquisitions contracts
should stipulate all indentured structure be provided in a data-readable format
prior to the fielding of the end item. This format would facilitate the use of RBS
at the System Commands.
2. Combat Essentiality Codes (CEC)
Ivancovich argues that combat essentiality codes must be overhauled. The
CECs differentiate between parts that will render an end item inoperable and parts
not critical to the operation of the end item. CECs are also the primary criteria in
stocking inventories. Ivancovich further explains that the overhaul should not be
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considered as an update but a complete change to reflect the current operational
usage [Ref. 18]. When the overhaul of the CECs is completed, supply personnel
would have a better handle in identifying the critical parts and also be able to
make tradeoffs in providing the required support.
In reviewing the end items present in the Marine Corps inventory, a very
high percentage is not solely managed by the Marine Corps. The Army and the
Navy control most of the end items and are responsible for the CECs. These
controlling agencies are known as the Primary Inventory Control Agencies
(PICA). In order for the new codes to be overhauled and incorporated, the PICAs
must be integrated in the process. Since the Army is having the same problems
with the codes for common end items as the Marine Corps, coordinated efforts
between the two branches must be established in developing the new code
structure. If the Army continues to have problems with the required data
overhauls in implementing RBS, then the Marine Corps must take the lead
[Ref. 19].
C. FAILURE RATES
There are basically two types of failure rates: demand failure rates and
operational failure rates. The Marine Corps currently uses failure rates based on
demand data. The problem with this type of failure rates is that it does not
accurately account for end item usage and density [Ref. 19]. Density refers to the
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quantity of equipment being supported. Operational failure rates combine the
demand failure rates and also the relevant factors required for RBS.
1. Demand Failure Rates
The Marine Corps' two logistical information systems that collect demand
data are SASSY and MIMMS. SASSY demand is used to forecast consumable
inventories, while MIMMS demand is used to forecast reparable inventories.
MIMMS demand data is designed to flow through and be captured by SASSY.
Therefore, the two files are designed to be equivalent [Ref. 4].
While attempting to develop operational failure rates, CNA compared the
demand data between the logistics systems, SASSY and MIMMS, and concluded
that the demand history for specific parts registered a different number of failures.
For example, in MIMMS a particular repair part registered 14 failures, while in
SASSY, zero failures were recorded [Ref. 4]. The magnitude of inaccuracies
between the two logistics systems demonstrates a lack of integrity for all data.
A possible solution suggested by Capt. Penrose is use of only one system to
capture demand data for inventory modeling. For example, the maintenance
information system could serve to capture demand for RBS. RBS is concerned
with capturing the demand for actual repairs made to end-items, which represents
a closer match with the maintenance information system [Ref. 5].
In contrast, supply system demand is vulnerable to distortion through
various funding cycles, where purchases made are not immediately maintenance
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related. For example, at the end of the fiscal year, a supply officer with year-end
funding available may purchase a stockpile of tires to be prepared for a slow down
in funding at the beginning of the next year. This year-end bulk purchase bears
little relationship to the actual usage and consumption patterns of tires. Worse, the
bulk purchase distorts actual demand. This would create havoc with an RBS
model [Ref. 4]. This exact problem was sighted by the AMSSA in the previous
chapter.
2. Operational Failure Rates
Presently, the Marine Corps does not capture operational failure rates.
These rates must reflect the rate of failure of the part along with the duration,
extent, and type of usage [Ref. 19]. How usage is specified and how failure rates
are measured depends on the type and use of the part. For example, for tires,
mileage is the appropriate measurement and hours of operation would be a
measurement for headlights [Ref. 19]. It would be unrealistic to record the times
the Marines used the headlights or the number of starts to measure the failure rate
for starters. An easier measure, which is already available in MIMMS as an input,
is using mileage for the components of a vehicle.
The first step in determining operation failure rates is to understand how
current usage information is contained in the MIMMS EROs and whether the
information is accurate and useable. Usage data is recorded whenever the
maintenance management section opens up an ERO and the supply section enters
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a requisition under the ERO. All usage is accumulated for all parts that were
inputted with all EROs. For any given period of time, the total demand for a
specific part, total end item usage, and operational failure can be computed.
In March 1998, CNA was chartered to study the accuracy of the usage.
During the data collection research stage, they evaluated the MIMMS logistics
system and the data that was input for specific serial numbers of High-Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). The HMMWV was selected
because of its long service history of repair data. CNA collected information on
5,747 individual serial numbers and 48,712 records. They found that 69% of the
vehicles had erroneous information [Ref. 19].
In MIMMS there is a field currently present to capture data mileage for the
vehicle being repaired. For the ERO to be closed when receipt of parts and repairs
are completed, the Marine must input the mileage. Often the Marines input
erroneous number into the mileage data field. Examples were provided of
vehicles that were reviewed by CNA. In referring to the appendix, the upper left
side lists the various serial numbers. The lower right lists the Day Received in
Shop (DRIS). The DRIS is the date that the vehicle was inducted into
maintenance. The mileage input in the DRIS is the erroneous input identified by
CNA. In reviewing the mileage, it is clearly evident that the Marines that input
the data did not do it accurately. When the data is accurate, the system is able to
provide information to supply managers on the mean time between failure for
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components in the vehicle. Concurrently, if the Marines input accurate data for all
the vehicles throughout the Marine Corps, the system managers located at MCLB
Albany, Georgia would be able to provide the MTBF for various components. It
is true that all components do not break yearly, but information can be gathered
over an extensive period of time to accurately portray the MTBF. The reason that
CNA provided for the inaccurate data is that the present demand based sparing
models that are employed do not require accurate mileage information.
When all data is input accurately, MCLB Albany can collect the
information, on a yearly basis, and provide Marine units with estimated MTBFs
for components and consumable repair parts. Maintenance and Supply Officers
can then use this management information to assist in preventive maintenance of
the vehicle. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Army has a system
established for war reserve data collection, FEDC, but does not have a present
means for collecting garrison data. Since MIMMS is already established with this
data field, the Marine Corps can provide garrison information to the Army.
Information technology can help in this area. Currently, end-item usage is
entered by a mechanic manually filling out an ERO. Often the ERO is completed
in an office separate from the maintenance shop floor causing a time lapse before
the information is recorded. Additionally, there is no check to ensure the
information is entered correctly. This problem could be corrected by automating
the ERO process, via computer terminal, on the shop floor, with the entire repair
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history of the end-item recorded in a database and made accessible as soon as the
ERO is entered electronically. With this, end-item usage could be instantly
validated [Ref. 4].
D. SUMMARY
Much of the inaccurate data can be attributed to poor maintenance and
supply data collection, but this does not provide solutions to the problem. Some
solutions can range from training and incentive evaluations. CNA states that the
data that is necessary is not resident in Marine Corps logistics systems because the
Marine Corps does not use RBS [Ref. 18]. The data that is collected for the
present system is sufficient. The data fields that are inaccurate are not important
with the current system and motivation to get the accurate data is not present.
When the Marine Corps moves to an RBS methodology, there will be an emphasis
placed on correcting the inaccurate data collection techniques.
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V. IMPLEMENTING RBS IN THE MARINE CORPS
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to
conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the
introduction ofa new order of things.
Niccolo Machiavelli, "The Prince"
This chapter develops the steps necessary for implementing a change to
RBS in the Marine Corps. In moving to RBS there will be expected resistance to
change. The most important concepts for combating resistance to change are
setting the direction for the planned change, aligning personnel with the need for
change, motivation, and establishing a partnership with the Army.
A. PROPOSED STEPS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RBS
1. Improve Current Processes
The first step in the implementation process is a review of the logistics
information requirements, failures rates, and combat essentiality codes that need to
be conducted by the Deputy Chief of Staff of Installations and Logistics (I&L) and
AMSAA. The results of a review of the logistics information requirements would
be the development of an I&L policy. This policy would allow those responsible
for the collection of supply and maintenance data to support the current process
and which are also required for RBS [Ref. 18].
Despite the shortcomings identified by CNA with end item usage data,
training and motivation needs to be provided for those Marines responsible for the
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collecting and input of data. MIMMS contains the necessary data prompts, such
as mileage for vehicles and hours for engineer support equipment, to support the
collection of relevant information on the required repairs of end items. Additional
emphasis needs to be placed on correct data input.
With the accurate input of the required variables, the Marine Corps would
then be provided a mean and a normal distribution, of time between failures for
various components. This information is essential because it would give inventory
managers an average failure rate for components during peacetime operations. For
wartime data collection, the Marines can evaluate the data that is collected from
the Army's FEDC. If apprehension exists about using the FEDC, the Marine
Corps can develop a single test site during a Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) at
Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) at Twenty-nine Palms,
California.
Overhauling combat essentiality codes for end item will be a time intensive
task. For many of the weapon systems that the Marine Corps has in their
inventory, the Primary Inventory Control Agency (PICA) is the Army. The PICA
is the responsible agent for all information pertaining to weapon systems combat
essentiality codes. If the Marine Corps singularly overhauls the codes, the Army,
also being the PICA, must ratify the codes and adopt the same codes for their
weapon systems. Since the Army is having the same problems in this area,
Marines and the Army can jointly solve this problem. CNA suggested that if the
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Army does not get on board with the developed combat essentiality codes, then the
Marines should "drive the train" [Ref. 18]. This approach would be self-defeating.
A partnership between the two services must be established at the ground level if
implementation of RBS is to become realized for both services.
2. Improvements In the Logistics Information
This step encompasses changes that would affect logistics information that
would be specific to RBS. This process would also capitalize on and benefit the
improvements resulting from the first step, improving the current process. In
improving the logistics information, which involves MCLB Albany, MISCO, and
the Supply Battalions, heavy influence is placed on the development of indentured
structure, end-item readiness and cost goals, and data collection improvements in
data fields present in the current system, which are also a prerequisite for RBS.
The accurate development of the indentured structure for any weapon
system is the bedrock of logistics information. The indentured structure for all
current weapon systems must be developed and continually updated to reflect
configuration changes. Concurrently, all new weapon systems those are presently
going through the acquisition pipeline should have indentured structures
developed prior to the end-item being placed in service. Marine Corps Systems
Command (MARCORSYSCOM) must be involved in the development and
require contractors to submit detailed indentured structure for all weapon systems.
In the future, the request for weapon systems indentured structure should be
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included in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The ORD identifies
the Marine Corps requirement for specific weapon systems.
The indentured structure must include the hierarchical list of each
subassembly by NSN, the quantity of each subassembly and component, a list of
alternative subassemblies, and combat essentiality codes for each subassembly and
component [Ref. 18]. The PICA must also be included in the development
process of indentured structure.
Readiness and cost goals need to be established, ultimately by the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, for all weapon systems. This process can start
by reviewing the weapon systems within Marine Corps Bulletin 3000. This
bulletin lists all items that the Marine Corps deems as critical and required for
combat operations. At this point, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and
Logistics must take the lead in briefing all senior officers on the need for readiness
and costs goals and prioritizing these weapon systems.
Improvements must also be made in the supply and maintenance data for all
end items. The specific supply and maintenance information that needs to be
improved is the same RBS data fields that were mentioned in the first step. The
data requirements for each subassembly, component, or piece part failure rates,
LRT, which includes backorder times and procurement lead times, RCT, SMR
codes, and cost and accounting data must be gathered [Ref. 18].
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3. Asset Tracking Logistics Asset and Supply System (ATLASS)
Integration
The final step in the implementation process is full and seamless integration
of the RBS required data fields with the current development of the newest version
of ATLASS. The result of the review of the logistics information as proposed in
the first step of implementation must be incorporated into the development of
ATLASS [Ref.18]. Furthermore, the improvements in the supply and
maintenance data collection during all steps of the proposed implementation plan
must be fully supported by ATLASS. Having two stand-alone systems, one for
RBS and the other for ATLASS, would hinder implementation and acceptance of
RBS. This was evident in the Army's implementation of RBS.
B. A TIME FOR CHANGE
The implementation plan treats problems identified during interviews and
from analysis of studies completed by CNA and AMSAA. However, change
succeeds only when the entire organization participates. To develop a plan only
takes one person, but to implement a plan takes the leadership of many.
In "Implementing Change" Todd Jick explains that an organizational
change effort can be broken into three categories. The first category includes
change strategists who are responsible for identifying the need for change and
creating the vision. In the case of RBS, the change strategist is the Secretary of
Defense who, in 1985, directed the Armed Forces to develop an RBS methodology
and models to coincide with a weapons system management concept. The second
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category is the change implementers who manage the day to day process and help
shape change. The final category is made up of change recipients, primarily the
first line supervisors and their staff, who are the largest group within the
organization that must adopt and/or adapt to the change.
In management literature, "authors portray change [as] a bounded, defined,
and discrete process with guidelines for success.... [Ref. 20]. In other words,
change is a step-by-step process that leads to a successful implementation.
However, this view of change is far from the truth. Many managers discover that
change can be fraught with chaos [Ref. 20].
In licks' essay, he documented multiple studies that examined pitfalls in
implementing change. Some of the key pitfalls listed were:
1) Major problems surfacing that were not identified beforehand;
2) Coordination of implementation activities (i.e., conferences, and
committees) was not effective;
3) Training and instruction given to lower-level employees were not
adequate;
4) Capabilities of personnel involved in the implementation were not
sufficient;
5) Change agents failed to win adequate support;
6) Failure to involve all individuals affected by the change [Ref. 20].
In implementing a change to RBS, the Marine Corps must overcome these
pitfalls.
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C. A CASE IN OVERCOMING THE RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
During World War II at the height of beef rationing, Kurt Lewin conducted
an interesting experiment that exhibited how to overcome resistance to change.
The experiment was conducted to get the public to consume the cow's internal
organs. Lewin set up the experiment using three methods to help determine the
best way to alleviate the public's resistance to change. The first method consisted
of one-sided communication without questions and answers by a lecturer
providing information and rationale why the public should eat the internal organs.
The second method consisted of two-way communication between the lecturer
and the audience. This method provided the same information and rationale, but
allowed the audience to interact and provide feedback in the form of questions or
statements. The final method was to arrange the audience in a circle and generate
a complete and free flowing discussion of the issue through the use of a facilitator
[Ref. 21]. At the end of the experiment, the third method, the group that was
personally engaged, brought about a positive change in accepting this new food.
As shown with this experiment, resistance to change can be overcome, but the
most important variables are free flow of communication and information.
It is common in the military to adopt Lewin' s first method, where the
briefer describes the proposed changes and how they will be implemented without
any regard to additional problems that are foreseen by the audience. When the
problems are identified, the implementation process is in full swing, and the
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process is hard to reconcile. With the implementation of RBS the Marine Corps
should adopt Lewin's third method. Dialogue between the facilitator, in this case
I&L, is required, and the Marines in the fleet must understand and buy into the
change to RBS.
D. LEADERSHIP
1. Setting the Direction
To make the fundamental changes from the present inventory management
system to an RBS inventory management, the Marine Corps must first set a
direction. The first step in setting the direction would be to develop a vision along
with the strategies/plans for producing the changes needed to realize the vision of
the future [Ref. 22].
In 1982, the vision of a weapons system management concept was
developed by publishing the Juliano memorandum and then following up three
years later with a directive by the Secretary of Defense requiring all services to
adopt and implement the new concept [Ref. 1]. The progression to a weapons
system management concept was needed due to the austere budgets and an
emphasis on readiness. The services were caught off guard when they were told to
develop and implement the methodology before the turn of this century.
However, the vision took hold in the Air Force, who then developed various
models and presently has surpassed the other services on RBS implementation.
The Marine Corps, on the other hand, published MCO 4105. IB in 1990, but has
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not progressed further. The use of Lewin's first method to communicate the
Department of Defense's vision of a weapons system inventory management
concept was a poor choice. When the vision was published by the Secretary of
>
Defense, all the services should have been trained on the new concept and
partnerships should have been forged.
In setting the direction for change to an RBS methodology, all elements in
the Marine Corps will need to be involved. However, the impetus for setting the
direction should originate from within Precision Logistics. As identified in
Chapter I, Precision Logistics is the focal point for all logistics activities that
would encompass better commercial business practices; it is also responsible for
developing and modifying consumer level supply policy and its associated
directives. Precision Logistics must be the facilitator during the implementation
steps of RBS.
Given all the fundamental changes occurring in the private sector that will
soon also occur in the military, a visible and influential individual must be
identified with the planned change if it is to be successful. In the private sector
this individual is classified as a "change agent", but in the military he/she would
be classified as a "champion". Throughout this thesis, this individual will be
identified as a change agent. For the Marines, the change agent should be a highly
visible leader and who is identifiable in the logistics arena and throughout the
Department of Defense. Obviously, s/he must be a proponent of RBS
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methodology and a true believer in the need for change. S/he must also construct
an appealing future state for the Marine Corps. The Deputy Chief of Staff for
Installations and Logistics could be the ideal RBS change agent. As indicated in
Chapter III, a change agent is not present in the Army. AMSAA has continually
tried to get the Deputy Chief of Staff of Logistics to carry the torch for RBS, but
has not been successful.
2. Aligning Marines
The first aspect of aligning Marines to accept RBS involves
communication. Effective communication of planned change is necessary to
garner the understanding and support of the Marines affected, directly or
indirectly, by the changes [Ref. 23].
The Marine Corps should undertake a "bottom-up" approach in changing
inventory management. This approach comprises bringing together the initiators
of the change to RBS and the Marines affected by the change. Bringing these
groups together can create an environment for effective communication. The goal
in this approach is commitment to RBS and not merely forced compliance [Ref.
23]. The communication interaction among these Marines together should mirror
Lewin's experiment and his use of the third method of open communication.
Rick Ross echoes Lewin's third method when he states that groups must come
together and dialogue with the intention of exploration, discovery and insight. In
an atmosphere of dialogue, the group can challenge and surface assumptions, and
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examines various sources of disagreement. Dialogue should improve the quality
of the group's collective thinking and interaction
[Ref. 24].
To establish an atmosphere of dialogue and partnership in discussing the
proposed steps to implement RBS, Precision Logistics should select a target
audience consisting of technical experts and first line supervisors from all aspects
of inventory management (data collection, information systems), AMSAA,
financial management, and supply/maintenance support. In addition, any other
representatives who can help implement RBS or who can block the
implementation must also be involved. The cross section of personnel is required
because the implementation involves making changes, in some cases fundamental
changes, to the way the Marine Corps operates at all levels.
Dialogue at the conference should discuss the need for an RBS
implementation plan and five key parameters:
1
)
Problems with the present inventory system;
2) Identification of specific problems of moving the Marine Corps to
RBS;
3) Tasks that must be altered to provide the necessary data
requirements for RBS;
4) Ranking of problems in the order of importance that could
undermine migrating to RBS. Examples of potential problems
include inaccurate data collection, lack of indentured structure for
weapon systems, and inaccurate data field within logistics systems;
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5) Categorization of problems according to major command
responsibility such as indentured structure and combat essentiality
code problems [Ref. 20].
This conference would provide validation and/or changes in the steps of the
proposed implementation plan. It would also serve as an impetus for individuals
to go back to their parent commands and solicit questions and provide answers to
assigned problems. It is important that continuous dissemination of information
about RBS implementation circulate throughout the Marine Corps. Information
dissemination can range from Marine administrative messages to an internet web
page.
A second result from the conference should be the establishment of a
training team, composed of supply/maintenance and financial management
personnel, with the prime responsibility for facilitating small group discussions of
RBS, developing training seminars, and providing recommendations on how to
better implement the change strategy.
3. Motivating Marines
People resist change for a variety of reasons. Often personnel have had
negative experiences with change, are satisfied with the status quo, and provided
poor communication about the change. On the other hand, people who have high
achievement needs are more likely to embrace change. These same individuals
are even more likely to accept change when there is a tangible payoff [Ref. 25].
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Change is the function of leadership; leaders must generate highly
energized behavior to cope with the inevitable barriers to change [Ref. 21].
Motivation ensures that barriers to change can be overcome and it is a
psychological force that steers the direction of a person's behavior in an
organization and affects a person's level of effort and persistence.
There are many motivational theories that study change, but one of the best
known is Herzberg's Motivation-Hygiene Theory. This theory links the
relationship of motivation and satisfaction. His theory states there are two types of
factors in the work environment that tend to create satisfaction and motivation.
Those increasing motivation includes meaningful work, recognition, achievement,
and advancement. The second type of factors, called hygiene factors, include
those factors that can dissatisfy individuals, such as pay, status, security and
working conditions. Table 5.1, summarizes the two factor attributes.
Table 5.1. Herzberg's 2- Factor Theory [Ref. 26]
Hygiene Factors Motivators










Within this theory two forms of motivation are also involved: intrinsic and
extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation occurs when an individual performs an activity for
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its own sake. The task itself is interesting and meaningful. Extrinsic type of
rewards are of secondary importance. This form of motivation is linked with
Herzberg' job-motivating factors: recognition, achievement and advancement. To
help generate this form of motivation in Marines, training must be provided in
RBS methodology and its advantages over the present system. This education
should include a description of RBS, discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of a move to RBS and the problems associated with implementing
RBS.
The dissatisfaction or hygiene factors are extrinsic to the job: pay, security
and status. Extrinsic motivation occurs when activities are performed to attain a
reward such as a meritorious mast, achievement medal, a day off, or to avoid an
adverse consequence such as an unsatisfactory performance evaluation.
For the implementation of RBS to be successful and effective, the Marine
Corps must be able to link a combination of these forms of motivation together in
order to satisfy a Marine's basic needs to accomplish the necessary tasks assigned.
It is also necessary for the Marines involved in the initial stages of RBS
implementation to have their performance formally linked to a reward system.
This system should not only include intrinsic motivation that front line supervisors
provide in daily positive counseling, but also with extrinsic motivation for Marines
to accomplish significant goals during the implementation process.
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An additional way to motivate Marines to accept change is for them to
participate in change and to build ownership of the change [Ref. 27]. Active
participation in change also facilitates communication about the change and the
reason the change has come about. If the Marines are involved in the change vice
being coerced to make the change, they may foster and devise more efficient
vehicles to collect the relevant data that is required for RBS. This situation is
conducive to commitment, not just compliance.
E. ARMY INVOLVEMENT
As described in Chapters III and IV, the Army and the Marine Corps are
having the same problems with data collection. As it has been shown, the Marine
Corps relies heavily on the Army for supply support and overall management of
weapon systems. It would behoove the Marines to include the AMSSA and
elements of the Army's logistics activities in the steps for implementing RBS.
AMSAA has made large strides in the past eight years in developing RBS models
and overcoming their data collection problems. This places the Marine Corps in a
superior position to capitalize from AMSAA' s and the Army's experience. A
partnership between the two services must be forged to better serve their
respective customers and provide a unified direction in attaining the Department
of Defense's vision of weapon systems inventory management.
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F. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the need for a conference, with Precision
Logistics as the facilitator and key personnel within the Marine Corps in
attendance, to establish a dialogue on RBS implementation and the associated
problems. The products from the conference should be a proposed plan of how to
proceed with RBS data improvements and an initial assignment to implement
elements of the plan.
The lessons learned from the Army's RBS implementation process are the
need for open and continuous communication, a committed change agent, and
methods to motivate soldiers to buy in to the change. The acceptance and adoption
of these three concepts would help the Marine Corps effectively implement RBS.
Finally, the Marine Corps must form a partnership with the Army. The problems
that exist in both services, indentured structure for like weapon systems and
combat essentiality codes to implement RBS, are similar. Due to this similarity,
jointly working together and solving these problems would benefit both services
and provide a stepping stone in achieving the Department of Defense's weapon
system management vision.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The demand for increased readiness of weapon systems will continue to put
pressure on all the services in the future. With the likelihood of continuing austere
budgets for the funding of operations and maintenance, more specifically the
maintenance of weapon systems, the Secretary of Defense directed the services to
manage inventories in relation to weapon systems. Presently, moving to an RBS
methodology provides the answer to these budget woes. The RBS inventory
model, unlike DBS, is a concept for a requirement's determination that associates
spares to individual weapon systems in order to sustain a specified level of
operational availability. RBS responds to the changing needs, priorities, and
management-imposed constraints of a weapon system in the most cost-effective
manner in order to ensure the readiness of the system is not degraded. Progressing
to RBS is a complete paradigm shift from the DBS inventory model.
Examining the Army's implementation of RBS provides the Marine Corps
with a benchmark in diagnosing the Army's problems along with its successes.
The main reason for the Army's resistance to implementing RBS is the lack of
understanding and knowledge of the concepts and methodology of RBS.
Presently, AMSAA has not reversed its strategy in trying to get the Army to
implement RBS. This is where the Marine Corps can capitalize on AMSAA 's
problematic strategy along with its successes.
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This thesis also analyzed the studies completed by CNA to determine what
problems the Marine Corps would encounter in progressing to RBS. CNA
identified that much of the inaccurate data can be attributed to poor maintenance
and supply data collection, but did not provide any solutions to the problem.
Solutions to the problems can range from training to incentives. CNA relates the
poor state of inaccurate data to training; however, data necessary for RBS is not
resident in Marine Corps logistics systems because the Marine Corps does not
capture the needed data with the current systems.
Finally, the Marine Corps can successfully implement RBS through the
alignment of its personnel with the use of various forms of communication and
feedback mechanisms, a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and
strong leadership beginning with the change agent and working down the chain to
the front line supervisor.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Develop a Team to Thoroughly Study the Army's RBS Model
and Conduct Tests
The Marine Corps should actively pursue Readiness Based Sparing as the
premier method for inventory management. To start this process, the Marine
Corps should form a partnership with AMSAA to understand the Army's
problems and successes in progressing to RBS and analyze the Army's RBS
model, OSRAP. The Marine Corps should test this model in order to validate the
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reasons why a move to RBS would increase weapon systems readiness and cut
costs.
2. The Marine Corps Should Implement RBS
The Marine Corps should start to form a working group to look at the
requisite policy changes that need to take place in order to adopt RBS. RBS needs
to be implemented in the Marine Corps today. All the Army field demonstrations
that were discussed in this thesis, shows that RBS can improve weapon system
readiness at the least cost.
3. Use Precision Logistics as the Mechanism for Change to
Implement RBS
Since its inception as a concept and now as section within I&L, Precision
Logistics has been in the forefront in adopting best commercial practices. It is
recommended that Precision Logistics be the focal point for all training and
implementation ofRBS methodology within the Marine Corps. Precision logistics
should be the representatives that work with the Army in solving the problems that
plague both services in implementing RBS. Precision logistics must bring the
entire logistics community together to establish a dialogue on how to progress to
RBS and be the key force in overcoming the potential change barriers such as
apprehension and the need for awareness and the benefits of RBS.
C. FUTURE
Future research should consist of taking the OSRAP model that the Army
has developed and working with Dave Seibert, AMSAA, and importing Marine
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Corps demand data from one of the Supply Battalions into the model. An analysis
should then be accomplished, similar to AMSAA's field demonstrations with the
same detail.
A second area of research should consist in the reconciliation of the two
main logistics systems, MIMMS and SASSY. Since these two systems will be an
integral part in implementing RBS, the Marine Corps must find answers to why
the two systems, which capture the same data, provides different information on
the same parts. If this research is not completed the Marine Corps will not
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